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1 Linguistics and Psychology, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA, United States, 2 Linguistics, University of Maryland,
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In this paper, we present two experiments with 3-year-olds, exploring their interpretation
of sentences about desires. A mature concept of desire entails that desires may conflict
with reality and that different people may have conflicting desires. While previous literature
is suggestive, it remains unclear whether young children understand that (a) agents can
have counterfactual desires about current states of affairs and (b) agents can have
desires that conflict with one’s own desires or the desires of others. In this article,
we test preschoolers’ interpretation of want sentences, in order to better understand
their ability to represent conflicting desires, and to interpret sentences reporting these
desires. In the first experiment, we use a truth-value judgment task (TVJT) to assess
3-year-olds’ understanding of want sentences when the subject of the sentence has
a desire that conflicts with reality. In the second experiment, we use a game task to
induce desires in the child that conflict with the desires of a competitor, and assess
their understanding of sentences describing these desires. In both experiments, we find
that 3-year-olds successfully interpret want sentences, suggesting that their ability to
represent conflicting desires is adult-like at this age. Given that 3-year-olds generally
display difficulty attributing beliefs to others that conflict with reality or with the child’s own
beliefs, these findings may further cast some doubt on the view that children’s persistent
difficulty with belief (think) is caused by these kinds of conflicts.
Keywords: language acquisition, language development, theory of mind, belief, desire, attitude verbs, mental state
verbs, linguistics
INTRODUCTION
Human beings explain each other’s behavior in terms of concepts like BELIEF and DESIRE. When
we see, say, that Sally opened the cupboard, we infer that it was because she believed there was
food inside and she wanted to eat. An important question in the domain of cognitive development
centers around the origins of these concepts. When do children understand that other people have
beliefs and desires?
There has been considerable controversy concerning the age at which children can be said to
be sensitive to other people’s beliefs (Johnson and Maratsos, 1977; Wimmer and Perner, 1983;
de Villiers, 1995, 2005, 2007; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000; Wellman et al., 2001; de Villiers
and Pyers, 2002; Perner et al., 2003; Lewis, 2013; Lewis et al., 2017, and others). This question is
somewhat vexed by the fact that different researchers set the standard for what counts as good
evidence for belief attribution differently. All are agreed that the attribution of false beliefs to
someone else is required to demonstrate mastery of the BELIEF concept. However, they disagree
about what counts as evidence of false belief attribution, with some arguing that implicit measures
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indicate that the concept is in place early (Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Kovács et al.,
2010), and others arguing that such measures may be reflective
of heuristics or concepts with similar extensions, and that only
explicit verbal measures count as definitive evidence for BELIEF
understanding (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Thoermer et al.,
2012; Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Heyes, 2014). But certainly
all are in agreement that when children pass explicit, verbal false
belief tasks, the relevant concept must be in place. The gold
standard for demonstrating the full richness of BELIEF is the use
and comprehension of the words that make reference to that
concept.
Likewise, we can ask what the behavioral entailments
associated with an adult-like DESIRE concept are. And again we
find the same kinds of issues. A desire concept should support
an ability to represent desires that are counterfactual (i.e., conflict
with reality), that conflict with one’s own desires or with those of
others. It should support a representation of desires about states
of affairs, not just about objects, and an adult-like comprehension
of words like want should depend on having this concept.
Prior work using implicit measures suggests that children
are sensitive to the goals of human agents from as young as
5 months of age (Woodward, 1998, 1999, 2003), and that they
are sensitive to the goals of others which differ from their own
by 18 months of age (Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997). However,
it is not clear that success on these tasks requires a full-fledged
concept of desire: perhaps young children grasp that others have
desires that differ from their own, so long as these desires do
not conflict with each other; perhaps children make sense of
intentional actions merely teleologically, i.e., in terms of objective
facts and goals (Perner and Roessler, 2010); perhaps children
have an “objective” notion of desire about what is generally good,
but not yet a desire concept that holds across counterfactual,
subjective and conflicting desires (Perner et al., 2005). While
a few studies explicitly test children’s understanding of such a
“subjective” concept of desire (Moore et al., 1995; Rakoczy et al.,
2007; Rakoczy, 2010), these studies report considerable variability
in children’s performance, both within and across tasks.
In this paper, we probe young children’s concept of desire
through their comprehension of desire reports using the verb
want. We present two experiments testing whether 3-year-
olds can understand sentences reporting desires under three
conditions: (1) counterfactual desires that conflict with reality; (2)
desires that conflict with another person’s desires; and (3) desires
that conflict with the child’s own. We show that even with such
tests, children are able to understand want before their fourth
birthday. This suggests that 3-year-olds have a robust adult-
like understanding of want, which is not affected by additional
conflicts. Three-year-olds’ success with this diversity of desire
sentences implies that they have a robust understanding of the
desire concept, and can represent even conflicting desires.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Many previous studies have explored children’s understanding
of the desire concept and the verb want. These studies have
focused on desires for objects, conflicting desires for objects,
desires for states of affairs, and conflicting desires for states of
affairs.
Several studies have examined whether children expect an
agent to act in accordance with her desires. Wellman and
Woolley (1990) asked 2-year-olds to make predictions about
various characters’ actions, based on their desires. They found
that 2-year-olds were successful at predicting actions related
to people’s simple desires. Tasks using eye gaze measures have
been used to test even younger children’s desire representations.
Woodward (1998) tested 5- and 9-month-olds in a looking-time
paradigm. In her task, infants saw an agent reach for one of two
objects situated next to each other. After children were habituated
to this action, the positions of the objects were switched, and the
agent either reached for the same toy (now in a new position), or
made the same armmovement (same direction, but now reaching
for a new toy). Infants looked longer when the agent reached for
a new toy, even though the agent’s arm motion was the same as
in familiarization. They did not look longer when a non-human
grasping device was used, implying that only the movement of
the hand reflected the desires of an agent. This pattern held
for both 9-month olds and even 5-month olds (although with
weaker results). This set of studies shows that by as young as 5
months old, infants can encode the actions of agents, attribute
goals to them, and expect people to act in accordance with those
goals. However, we might view these results as reflecting an
understanding of goals and not desires per se.
Other tasks look at slightly older children’s ability to represent
conflicting desires for objects. Repacholi and Gopnik (1997)
examined whether 14- and 18-month-olds could appropriately
represent the desires of an agent that potentially differed from
the child’s own. In the task, the child was introduced to two
familiar and distinctive foods: goldfish crackers and broccoli.
After introducing each food, the researcher produced a salient
response—either positive or negative—toward each of the foods,
and then requested that the child give her some food. To
control for the possibility that children assumed that everyone
has the same desires, or the possibility that the child would give
the experimenter their own non-desired food in order to keep
the desired food for themselves, the researchers manipulated
whether the experimenter expressed preference for the same or
the opposite food from the child’s preferred food. The authors
found that most of the children preferred the crackers and that at
14-months, children were more likely to give the researcher the
crackers, regardless of which food she had expressed preference
for. By 18 months, however, they were more likely to give the
experimenter the food that she preferred, regardless of whether it
matched the child’s preference or not. This study shows that by 18
months, children seem to understand that different people may
have desires that differ from their own. As Rakoczy et al. (2007)
point out, however, while the experimenter’s desire for broccoli
differs from the child’s desire for crackers, the two desires are
not incompatible. Perhaps children’s notion of desire that allows
them to pass the task is a mere “objective” desire about what is
generally good: broccoli for the experimenter, and crackers for
the child (This would be in line with the teleological account of
Perner and Roessler, 2010). Hence, the task shows at least that
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children know that different objects may be good for different
people and possibly that children understand that others can have
desires that differ from their own. However, it does not show that
children understand conflicting desires.
To address conflicting desires, researchers have probed
children’s understanding of desires about states of affairs,
as reported by want sentences. Here the results are mixed.
Perner et al. (2003) tested children’s interpretation of want
sentences in German-speaking children, and compared it to
their understanding of think sentences. Children (2.5–4.5) saw
six stories, each of which was accompanied by a drawing. For
example, in one story, Mom and Dad were in one room and
their son Andy was watching television in his bedroom. In the
want condition, Mom asked Dad to see what Andy was doing.
Dad asked Mom what Andy should do, and Mom answered,
“Andy should go to bed.” Then the child was asked the want test
question, shown in (1).
(1) Was will die Mutter, dass Andreas tut?
what wants the Mom, that Andy does
‘What does Mom want Andy to do?’
In the think condition, Dad asked Mom what Andy was doing
and she answered, “Andy is going to bed.” Then the child was
asked the think test question, shown in (2).
(2) Was glaubt1 die Mutter, dass Andreas tut?
what believes the Mom, that Andy does
‘What does Mom believe that Andy is doing?’
They found that children gave more correct answers to the
questions with want than those with think, and concluded that
it is easier for children to remember discrepant desires than
discrepant beliefs.
However, it is not so clear that the mother’s desire in the story
is in conflict with reality. Note that English and German differ in
the syntactic properties of the verbs think and want. In English,
think takes a tensed complement, while want obligatorily takes
an untensed complement. By default, the untensed complement
ofwant receives a future-orientation when the verb is eventive [as
in (1)]. The temporal interpretation of the complement of think
depends on the tense in the complement: with a present tense,
the belief is present-oriented (a future-orientation would require
a future tensemorpheme, as in ‘Mom thinks that AndyWILL go to
bed). In German, both think andwant take tensed complements2.
However, with want (but not with think), it is nonetheless
possible to get a future-orientation with a present tense in
the complement (in fact it is the preferred interpretation)3.
Sentence (1) can thus be interpreted in two ways. It can get the
1Glauben is traditionally translated as believe, but was glossed as think in Perner
et al. (2003). Though there may be subtle meaning and usage differences between
think and believe, both verbs are used to report beliefs that can be true or false.
2German wollen (want) also allows nonfinite complements when the implicit
subject of the embedded clause is the same as the wanter [e.g., “Andy will schlaffen”
(“Andy wants to sleep”)].
3Think sentences in German can receive a future-oriented interpretation, but
this requires an adverb, such as “later.” Want sentences get a future-oriented
interpretation without an adverb by default.
interpretation in (3), which sets up a conflict between desire and
reality, but it also allows the (preferred) interpretation in (4),
which is future-oriented and thus avoids a conflict with reality.
(3) What does Mom want Andy to be doing (right now)?
(4) What does Mom want Andy to do (later)?
If children interpret (1) as meaning (4), Mom’s desire can still
be satisfied if Andy’s future actions match her current desire, in
which case there is no conflict between her desire and reality.
Thus, this task did not require children to interpret want under
truly conflicting conditions.
A pilot study reported in de Villiers (2005) controls better
for the possibility of future-oriented readings by using want
sentences with a participial complement. This structure forces
the time of the event to overlap with the time of the desire,
making this a better test of an actual present-oriented conflict. In
a representative story, a character named Bella was painting, but
her mother thought that she was playing on the computer and
was happy about it. Children were asked the question in (5).
(5) Does Mom want Bella playing on the computer?
De Villiers found that children were successful in interpreting
these want sentences. While these results are suggestive, the
number of children tested was small, and each only got two
critical trials. Thus, a larger study is necessary to assess children’s
comprehension of want sentences reporting counterfactual
desires. Furthermore, while the participial complement does
not allow a future orientation, it is not a fully sentential
complement. This may make interpretation of sentences like (5)
easier, and these results may consequently overestimate children’s
knowledge of want.
To see if children truly understand that agents can have
conflicting desires and do not merely rely on a merely “objective”
concept of desirability for states of affairs, rather than on amental
representation of desires, Rakoczy et al. (2007) tested whether
children fail to correctly interpret want in cases where desires are
subjective, with different people having non-compatible desires
(using a task first introduced by Lichterman, 1991). They showed
children (3.0–3.6) stories in which two characters quarreled about
which of two either compatible or incompatible outcomes they
preferred. In the compatible desires stories, two characters, Tom
and Susi, were each in boats. Tom wanted his boat to go to one
location, Susi wants her boat to go to another location. The boats
then go to one of the two locations. The incompatible desires
stories are the same, except that both characters were in the same
boat together, thus it was impossible for each character’s desire
to be satisfied simultaneously. After the story, the children were
asked the test questions shown in (6) and (7).
(6) Susi wanted the boat to go where?
(7) And Tom wanted the boat to go where?
Children succeeded on this task, suggesting that they can both
represent incompatible desires and interpret want sentences
before their fourth birthday. Note however that the future
orientation of (6) and (7) could still prevent a conflict between
reality and the desire, and hence not provide a stringent test of
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children’s ability to represent incompatible desires. The question
in (6) describes a past desire about an outcome future to this past
desire time. Although the boat did go to one of the two locations
at a time future to this desire time (namely, at the end of the
story), the future is open, and it is possible that the boat could still
subsequently go to a second location, and thus satisfy the desire
in the near future. To rule out this possibility, it is necessary to
make explicit that the desire is about a concurrent state of affairs.
Finally, two studies probe whether children understand that
an agent can have desires that conflict with their own desires.
Moore et al. (1995) looked at 3-year-olds’ understanding of
conflicting desires in a task in which they played a game against
a puppet, “Fat Cat.” The child and Fat Cat each had to solve
their own jigsaw puzzle for which they needed parts from a blue
or a red box. In each round, a card was drawn from a stack,
turned around and shown to be either blue or red. Both players
could then take a piece from the corresponding box. At first, both
players needed pieces from the same box (e.g., red box). However,
there came a point where their needs diverged, and thus their
desires for which color the card should be became incompatible
(still red for Fat Cat, blue for the child). At this point the child
was asked three control questions and two test questions below
[(8) is about the other’s desire, (9) about the child’s own outdated
desire]:
(8) Which color card does Fat Cat want now?
(9) Which color card did you want last time?
Only 7 of 20 children passed both test questions on the
conflicting-desire task, leading Moore et al. to conclude that
when children are forced to represent incompatible and
conflicting desires, they have difficulty interpreting sentences
with want.
Rakoczy et al. (2007) and Rakoczy (2010) were concerned
that the methodology used in the Moore et al. study may
have underestimated children’s knowledge, as the task was very
complex. Using a simpler game format modeled on the Moore
et al. study, they tested both conflicting “third person desires,”
where two puppets played against each other, and conflicting
“first person desires,” where the child played against a puppet.
In this task, children (3.0–3.6) worked together with a puppet
to make a sticker book, but only one sticker could go inside.
A “chance machine,” out of which a marble was dispensed,
determined one of two sticker possibilities: one was an exciting
sticker, and one was a boring sticker. Children always preferred
the more exciting sticker, and the puppet expressed interest in the
other sticker. The children were asked the test questions shown in
(10, 11).
(10) You want the marble to roll where?
(11) Rudi [puppet] wants the marble to roll where?
Rakoczy et al. found that the simpler probe of conflicting desires
did improve performance, compared to the original Moore
et al. study, with accuracy around 55% overall. There were no
differences between first and third person conditions. However,
children’s performance was still not adult-like. There may,
however, be further methodological concerns in this improved
task. As in the Moore et al. study, there were only one or two
critical trials. Additionally, the game was still fairly complex for
preschoolers, and the authors did not report training or set a
criterion to determine whether children understood the rules
of the game. Thus, they potentially underestimated children’s
understanding of want, as failures may have been due to a lack
of understanding of the rules of the game. To get at children’s
understanding of want in conflicting situations, it is critical to
exclude children who do not understand these rules, to ensure
that errors are due to difficulty processing or understanding
conflicting desires, and not to confusion about the game. To
sum up, it remains an open question whether 3-year-olds can
understand want sentences (and the underlying desire concept),
in cases of conflicting desires.
The previous tasks looking at children’s interpretation of
want can be improved in several ways, in order to license
better inferences about children’s knowledge. The first is in the
temporal orientation of the attitude verb. As discussed above,
want sentences often get a future-oriented reading, and thus do
not necessarily report a desire that conflicts with reality, or with
another person’s desire. Experiment 1 controls for the temporal
orientation of the complement of want, allowing us to test
children’s understanding ofwant when there is a conflict between
the reported desire and reality. Experiment 2 tests children’s
understanding of want sentences used to report desires that
conflict with their own. We improve on the methodology of the
previous studies by including a thorough training in those aspects
of the task that do not have to do with desire, and excluding
participants who do not understand the rules of the game. This
improvement decreases the likelihood that experimental artifacts
will lead us to underestimate children’s understanding of want
sentences.
EXPERIMENT 1: CONFLICT WITH REALITY
Experiment 1 tests want sentences that force a present-
orientation, and thus describe desires that potentially conflict
with reality and with another character’s desires.
Subjects
Participants were 44 children aged 3.0–4.0 (mean = 3.8). Sixteen
additional children were excluded from the task, either due to
yes- or no-biased responses, or parental interference. Children in
all three studies were recruited from the College Park, Maryland
area, and were reported by their parents to be monolingual
speakers of English. Participants were recruited via telephone or
email from the University of Maryland Infant Studies Database.
Design and Materials
Experiment 1 was a Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT), which
requires children to evaluate and potentially correct sentences
uttered by a “silly” puppet (Crain and McKee, 1985; Crain and
Thornton, 1998). TVJT tasks gauge whether children at a given
age pair certain linguistic stimuli to a given situation in an adult-
like way, or whether their interpretation of the stimuli differs in
some way from adult judgments. In this task, children listened
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TABLE 1 | Within and between subjects factors in Experiment 1.
CONFLICT/NO CONFLICT
(between subjects)
SWITCH/STAY
(within subjects)
TRUTH
(within subjects)
CONFLICT SWITCH True
False
CONFLICT STAY True
False
NO CONFLICT SWITCH True
False
NO CONFLICT STAY True
False
to stories with pictures. They were told that a puppet who was
“very silly and sometimes gets things wrong” was listening to the
stories as well, and asked to tell the puppet whether he was right
or wrong after every utterance. Each child saw eight stories. After
each story the puppet uttered two sentences: a filler sentence
and a test sentence. The fillers were intended to ensure that the
child was paying attention and had a basic understanding of what
happened in the story (e.g., Megan is at the grocery store with
her {Mom/Dad}). Test sentences had a sentential complement
which forced a present orientation by using a progressive (“be
___ING”), and the temporal modifier “right now” [see (12)].
(12) Momwants Megan to be sitting in the grocery cart right now.
There were a total of eight stories, each with two different
versions. Between subjects we manipulated whether the stories
contained a desire that conflicted with reality (CONFLICT
condition) or not (NO CONFLICT condition). Each of the stories
described a situation in which a child starts out doing a given
activity, and then an adult asks the child to either continue doing
the same activity (STAY condition) or switch to a new activity
(SWITCH condition). This manipulation was within subjects. Half
of the CONFLICT stories were STAY stories, the other half were
SWITCH stories. Each story was used in both CONFLICT and NO
CONFLICT conditions, and each story was used in both STAY and
SWITCH conditions. This ensured that each story was equally
plausible as a CONFLICT or NO CONFLICT situation, as well
as a SWITCH or STAY scenario. Additionally, it ensured that in
both the CONFLICT and NO CONFLICT conditions, the character
did not always start and end doing the same activity. We also
manipulated the truth-value of the test sentences within subjects.
Table 1 illustrates the within- and between-subjects factors in
Experiment 1.
Sample Story
The stories consisted of four pictures each. Each picture
represented about one sentence of a story. A sample of the text
of one story is laid out in Table 2 and Figure 1 (see Appendix for
complete set of stimuli).
Procedure
Each child was tested in a quiet room with two experimenters.
One experimenter told the child the stories and showed her the
pictures, while a second experimenter controlled the puppet and
uttered the filler and test sentences. The second experimenter
also coded the child’s responses. Permission was obtained from
parents to video record each subject for an additional round of
coding off-line.
The experiment began with the child being introduced to a
silly puppet, “Froggy.” The experimenters were somewhat flexible
with the script, adjusting to each child’s level of attention, but
followed the following script fairly closely:
“We’re going to be looking at some pictures and hearing some
stories that go along with them. And our friend Froggy is going
to listen to the stories with us, ok? And after we hear a story,
Froggy’s gonna try to tell us what happened in the story. But
sometimes, he’s not a very good listener. And so sometimes when
he tells us, he might get it wrong, ok? And you get to tell us
whether Froggy was right or wrong. Does that sound like a
good plan? OK, so listen carefully, because he says silly stuff
sometimes!”
The child then practiced interacting with Froggy. First Froggy
named a few items, and the child practiced telling him yes and no.
The child was corrected during this practice phase if they did not
correctly tell Froggy yes and no. Then the child was told two very
simple stories, and practiced responding to sentences Froggy said
about the stories. Froggy was correct once and incorrect once.
Again, the child was corrected if she did not respond correctly to
Froggy’s sentences.
During each test trial, Experimenter 1 read the story and
showed the child the pictures. After each story, Experimenter
1 turned to Froggy and asked “What happened in that story,
Froggy?” Then Froggy uttered the filler sentence, after which the
experimenter turned to the child and asked “Did Froggy get it
right?.” Then the child either responded yes or no. After the filler,
Froggy uttered the test sentence, and the child was again asked
whether or not hewas right and given the chance to respond yes or
no. Experimenter 1gave feedback toFroggy thatwas in accordance
with how the child had responded—“Good job, Froggy!” when the
child said that Froggy was correct, and—“Oh, silly Froggy! Try
again next time!” when the child said that Froggy was incorrect.
The entire experiment took around 8–10min per child.
Results
Coding
Children’s responses were coded online by the second
experimenter. Four out of the 60 videos were coded by a
second experimenter offline, because coding did not happen
online. Responses were coded as yes, or no. One response (out
of 1,080 total responses) was unintelligible. An additional 25%
(11 videos) were coded offline by an additional coder. We found
99.4% agreement between coders (Cohen’s Kappa= 0.989).
Filler Accuracy
The fillers were designed to ensure that children were listening
to the story. They did not rely on understanding want. Children
who answered either all yes or all no to 15 out of 16 total items (8
fillers, 8 test sentences) were excluded from analysis (the average
age of the excluded children was 3.4, which was not significantly
different from the age of the included children). Twelve children
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TABLE 2 | Experiment 1 sample story.
Introduction phase Megan is at the grocery store with her mom. She’s sitting in the cart
while her mom shops.
STAY/SWITCH phase STAY: Megan’s mom says, “Megan, I have to run and get something in
the next aisle, stay right there in the cart until I get back. And Megan
says, “No problem, mom!”
SWITCH: Megan’s mom says, “Megan, I have to run and get something
in the next aisle, can you climb out of the cart and go get some cereal?
And Megan says, “No problem, mom!”
CONFLICT/NO CONFLICT
phase
STAY/CONFLICT: Mom leaves, and Megan says to herself, “I know my
mom said I should stay in the cart, but I’d like to get out and go get
some cereal, so I will!”
SWITCH/NO CONFLICT: Mom leaves, and Megan says to herself, “I’d like
to stay right here in the cart, but my mom said to get out of the cart
and go get some cereal, so I will!”
STAY/NO CONFLICT: Mom leaves, and Megan says to herself, “I’d like to
get out of the cart and go get some cereal, but my mom said to stay in
the cart, so I will!”
SWITCH/CONFLICT: Mom leaves, and Megan says to herself, “I know my
mom said to get out of the cart and go get some cereal, but I’d like to
stay right here in the cart, so I will!”
Outcome phase STAY/CONFLICT: So she climbs out of the cart to go get some cereal. SWITCH/NO CONFLICT: So she climbs out of the cart to go get some
cereal.
STAY/NO CONFLICT: So she stays right there in the cart. SWITCH/CONFLICT: So she stays right there in the cart.
Test sentence STAY/CONFLICT SWITCH/NO CONFLICT
TRUE Mom wants Megan to be sitting in the cart right now! Mom wants Megan to be getting cereal right now!
FALSE Mom wants Megan to be getting cereal right now! Mom wants Megan to be sitting in the cart right now!
STAY/NO CONFLICT SWITCH/CONFLICT
TRUE Mom wants Megan to be sitting in the cart right now! Mom wants Megan to be getting cereal right now!
FALSE Mom wants Megan to be getting cereal right now! Mom wants Megan to be sitting in the cart right now!
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1 sample story.
were excluded due to yes-biased responses (20%). Three children
were excluded due to no-biased responses (5%). One additional
child was excluded due to parental interference. The age range
that we were testing for this study is quite young for the
TVJT paradigm, which likely contributed to the high number
of children with yes- or no-biases. Overall filler accuracy,
including children who were excluded, was 67%. Filler accuracy
for the children included in the analysis was 80%.
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TABLE 3 | Percent yes responses by condition for Experiment 1.
CONFLICT/NO
CONFLICT (between
subjects)
SWITCH/STAY
(within subjects)
TRUTH
(within
subjects)
% Yes responses
children 3.0–4.0
CONFLICT SWITCH True 93.2
False 13.6
CONFLICT STAY True 79.1
False 17.8
NO CONFLICT SWITCH True 79.5
False 11.4
NO CONFLICT STAY True 93.2
False 15.9
Truth-Value Judgments
The results for each condition are shown in Table 3.
We used mixed-effect logit models (Bates and Sarkar, 2007) to
analyze the results. These models are well suited for analyzing
categorical data (Baayen, 2007; Jaeger, 2008). The reported
models have random intercepts. These models predict the
probability of a specific response (a correct answer) in the
different conditions (see Agresti, 2002; Jaeger, 2008). We ran a
mixed-effect logit model with “yes” responses as the dependent
measure, with Conflict, Switch, and Truth as fixed effects, and
Item and Subject as random effects.We tested for each of the two-
way interactions, testing Truth against a model dropping each of
the fixed effects. We find a main effect of Truth [X2(1) = 6.41,
p < 0.001], but no main effects of Conflict [X2(1) = −0.67, p =
0.504] or Switch [X2(1) = −1.82, p = 0.068]. We find a significant
two-way interaction between Conflict and Switch [X2(1) = 1.99,
p = 0.047], but no other significant two-way interactions. We
then tested the full model against a model with only Truth and
the interaction between Conflict and Switch as fixed variables.
We find a significant main effect of Truth [X2(1) = 9.65, p <
0.001], but no main effects of Conflict [X2(1) =−1.05, p= 0.29] or
Switch [X2(1) = −1.79, p = 0.073], and a marginally significant
interaction of Conflict and Switch [X2(1) = 1.95, p = 0.051].
The main predictor of children’s “yes” responses was Truth. The
best-fit model was one in which only Truth and the interaction
between Conflict and Switch predicted children’s “yes” responses,
with the effect of Truth being much greater than that of the
Conflict/Switch interaction4. Children were significantly more
likely to respond yes to the True items, and no to the False
items, regardless of whether the item was a CONFLICT or a NO
CONFLICT item, or whether it was a SWITCH or STAY item. These
results indicate that 3-years-olds behave as if they understand
want sentences correctly, even when they are present-oriented
and describe a desire that conflicts with reality5.
4Because of the relatively high number of children excluded from this task, we did
additional analyses to ensure that the conclusions drawn from the data reflect the
general population of 3-year-olds. If we include the additional 15 children who
had originally been excluded due to yes or no response biases, we find the same
significant main effect of Truth and no other main effects or interactions.
5An anonymous reviewer points out that children’s behavior is also consistent with
children interpreting want as tell in these stories.
Experiment 1 Discussion
In this study, we set up situations in which characters had
desires that conflicted both with reality, as well as with another
character’s desires. We used linguistic stimuli that disallowed
future-oriented readings of want sentences to ensure that the
reported desires were about concurrent states of affairs, and
conflicted with reality and across characters. We find that 3-
year-old children are fully adult-like in interpreting such want
sentences. This shows that 3-year-olds can correctly understand
want sentences used to describe counterfactual desires6.
EXPERIMENT 2
Previous results looking at 3-year-olds’ ability to understand
reports of desires that conflict with their own are inconsistent,
and raise several methodological concerns. Experiment 2
remedies these concerns, by ensuring that children fully
understand the rules of the game before they were tested on
want, and by including more critical trials. We set up a task
where children play a game with a puppet, in which their desires
sometimes conflict, and then children are asked about those
conflicting desires. This task requires children to maintain in
memory both their own desires and the puppet’s desires.
Subjects
Participants were 43 children aged 3.0–4.0 (mean = 3.8). Twelve
additional children were excluded from the task: 10 did not pass
the practice, and two did not finish the task.
Design and Materials
Experiment 2 was set up like a game. The child played with a
puppet, Froggy, while another puppet, Booboo, was “learning”
and said things about the game. The child’s job was to tell Booboo
whether he was right or wrong. The experimenter flipped colored
cards (four different colors), and depending on the color of the
card, the outcome was either (1) positive for Froggy, (2) the child,
(3) both of them, or (4) neither of them (the positive outcome
was that someone got to stamp their paper). This set-up induced
desires in the child, which sometimes conflicted with the puppet’s.
The child was told that Booboo was “not very good at colors and
sometimes gets things mixed up,” and was asked to tell Booboo
whether he was right or wrong after every utterance. Each child
participated in 4, 8, or 12 practice trials and sixteen test trials. The
purpose of the practice trials was to teach the child how the game
is played, and to have a measure to exclude children who did not
understand how the game worked. The practice trials involved
Booboo uttering a sentence that the child had to correct, just like
the test trials, but the sentences were about the structure of the
6An anonymous reviewer points out that both desired situations—Megan staying
in the cart, and Megan getting cereal—are objectively desirable: the former makes
Mom happy, the latter makes Megan happy. So there is reason for action to make
both desirable situations happen. In the terms of Priewasser et al. (2013), the
desires are incompatible (both can’t be realized), but not contradictory (they can
both be desirable). Hence these results may not be at odds with children being
teleologists, in terms of the actions they expect of others. While this may be true,
our goal here is to show that children understand want sentences which describe
desires that conflict, but we can’t tell how they use this information in reasoning
about actions.
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game, not a desire. An example of a practice question is shown in
(13).
(13) Oh, I see how the game works! When it’s green, Froggy gets to
stamp!
After the child corrected Booboo, the experimenter flipped the
card, and asked the child to tell everyone who got to stamp
based on the color of the card. This ensured that participants
understood the rules of the game and were comfortable playing
before the test trials started. Each child had at least four and at
most 12 practice trials. We continued with the practice until the
child got four in a row correct, and then we moved on to the test
trials. If the child did 12 practice items and did not learn how the
game worked, they did not move on to the test trials and hence
were not included in the analysis.
Each test trial consisted of two test sentences [examples in (14)
and (15)], one about Froggy’s desire and one about the child’s
desire.
(14) Froggy wants the card to be green!
(15) You want the card to be green!
After Booboo uttered the test sentences and the child said
whether he was right or wrong, the experimenter flipped the card
to reveal who really would get to stamp. The experimenter then
asked the child the filler question, which was about the outcome
based on color [example in (16)], and then the appropriate
player(s) stamped their paper(s).
(16) Oh! We got green! Who gets to stamp when we get a green
card?
The fillers were intended to ensure that the child was paying
attention and understood how the game worked. Children were
encouraged to try again if they got the fillers incorrect. This
happened very rarely during the game.
This study was a 2 × 2 × 2 design, and all manipulations
were within subjects. We manipulated whether we were asking
about a desire with a conflict (CONFLICT condition) or not (NO
CONFLICT condition). Additionally, we manipulated whether we
were asking about a positive outcome from the child’s perspective
(POSITIVE condition) or not (NEGATIVE condition). We also
manipulated whose desire we were asking about (SENTENCE), the
child’s (CHILD DESIRE condition) or Froggy’s (FROGGY DESIRE
condition). The test sentence is true when it reports a positive
outcome for its subject, and false when it reports a negative
outcome for its subject, except in the condition where both
the child and Froggy get to stamp, in which case the sentence
can be judged as either true or false: the outcome where both
players get to stamp may be judged as undesirable, depending on
how competitive one takes the game. We counterbalanced order
between subjects. Table 4 illustrates the within-subjects factors in
Experiment 2.
Color and outcome were counterbalanced within subjects, so
that every color and every outcome occurred an equal number
of times during the game. We also rotated which colors were
paired with which outcomes throughout the game, to ensure
that a color bias would not affect the results. We rotated a
TABLE 4 | Within-subjects factors in Experiment 2.
CONFLICT/
NO CONFLICT
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE SENTENCE (Froggy vs.
Child desire)
TRUTH
CONFLICT POSITIVE (child stamps) “FROGGY WANTS…” False
“YOU WANT…” True
CONFLICT NEGATIVE (Froggy stamps) “FROGGY WANTS…” True
“YOU WANT…” False
NO CONFLICT POSITIVE (Child & Froggy
stamp)
“FROGGY WANTS…” True/False
“YOU WANT…” True/False
NO CONFLICT NEGATIVE (No one stamps) “FROGGY WANTS…” False
“YOU WANT…” False
TABLE 5 | Sample of trial in Experiment 2.
Booboo: Froggy wants the card to be blue!
E1: Did Booboo get it right?
Child: yes/no
E1: Good job/try again, Booboo!
Booboo: You want the card to be green!
E1: Did Booboo get it right?
Child: yes/no
E1: Good job/try again, Booboo! OK, let’s flip! [E1 flips card] Oh! we got green!
What happens when we get a green card?
Child: ____ gets to stamp!
E1: Good job! Let’s stamp! … ok, Booboo, tell us something about the game …
total of four times during the game, after every four sets of test
questions. Within each of the four blocks, each color and each
outcome occurred one time. A schematic of a trial is shown in
Table 5.
Procedure
Experiment 2 began with the child being introduced to “Froggy,”
with whom they would be playing the game. The experimenters
were somewhat flexible with the script, adjusting to each child’s
level of attention, but the experimenters followed the following
script fairly closely:
“We’re going to play a game with Froggy today where we get to
flip cards! And every time that we flip a card, someone gets to
put a stamp on their paper. Froggy loves stamps. . . do you like
stamps? OK, so every card that we flip has a color, and we can
look at the board [experimenter points] to see who gets to stamp
when we flip that color. OK, so when we flip a green card, you
and Froggy both get to stamp. When we flip a brown7 card just
Froggy gets to stamp. When we flip a blue card just you get to
stamp. And when we flip a pink card no one gets to stamp.”
Then the child was introduced to the silly puppet, Booboo:
7The brown card was occasionally named by the child as a different color, e.g.,
tan. In these cases we adapted the name of the color based on what the child said.
Children had no difficulty with any other colors used in the game.
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“OK, one more thing! Froggy’s friend Booboo the baboon wants
to learn how to play the game, so he’s going to watch us play. But
he’s not very good at colors, so sometimes he gets things mixed
up! Sometimes he’s going to try to tell us something about how
the game works, but he might get it wrong, and your job is going
to be to help him out and tell him whether he’s right or wrong so
he can learn how to play the game. How does that sound?”
The child then practiced interacting with Booboo. First Booboo
practiced naming colors, half of which he got right and half of
which he got wrong, and the child practiced telling him yes and
no. The child was corrected during this color practice phase if
they did not correctly tell Booboo yes and no. Then we moved
on to the practice phase, where the child saw between 4 and 12
practice trials. Again, during this phase the child was corrected
when they made an error.
After sufficient practice, we moved on to the test phase.
During each test trial, Booboo uttered each test sentence, and
Experimenter 1 asked the child if Booboo was right. Then the
child gave her response. Experimenter 1 gave feedback to Booboo
that was in accordance with how the child had responded, as in
the previous experiment. After both test sentences, Experimenter
1 flipped the card to see who would get to stamp and then
asked the child the filler question. After the child responded, the
appropriate player(s) stamped their paper(s), and we moved on
to the next test trial. The entire experiment took around 20min
per child.
Results
Coding
Children’s responses were coded online by the second
experimenter. Four out of the 55 videos were coded by a
second experimenter offline, because coding did not happen
online. Responses were coded as yes, or no. An additional 15
videos were coded offline by an additional coder to ensure
reliability of the online coding. We found 97.9% agreement
(Cohen’s Kappa= 0.952).
Practice and Filler Accuracy
This experiment included an extensive training and practice
section. There were four practice items. Children had to get all
four in a row right to be included. We went through all the items
either once (four items), twice (eight items), or three times (12
items). This means that children had a minimum of four practice
items, and a maximum of 12. Ten out of the total of 55 children
tested (18%) did not pass the practice after three rounds and were
thus excluded from the rest of the experiment and analysis. Of the
subjects for whom we recorded practice data, 26 went through
the practice items once, 14 went through the practice items twice,
and 3 went through the practice items three times. We find that
overall performance was not different for the groups of children
who did the practice items once or twice. The three children who
did the practice items three times had lower overall performance
(Table 6). This may be related to an overall difficulty for this
group on this task, or it may be due to the fact that for these
children the task took a longer amount of time, thus, they may
have been more fatigued by the time they got to the test. For the
TABLE 6 | Experiment 2: accuracy by number of practice items.
Number of rounds of
practice items
% Appropriate responses on test
items
1 90
2 92
3 59
No data 85
additional children, the practice session was not recorded, due to
a technical error.
The fillers were designed as a control to ensure that children
were paying attention during the game as well as to keep them
engaged. Once children were included after the practice phase,
they rarely had any difficulty correctly saying who got to stamp
after each card flip, and asking the child after each card flip was an
extremely natural question during the game. If they incorrectly
answered the filler, they were directed to try again.
Truth-Value Judgments
The results for each condition are shown in Table 7.
We used mixed-effect logit models (Bates and Sarkar, 2007)
to analyze the present results. The reported models have random
intercepts. We ran a mixed-effect logit model with “yes” as the
dependent measure, with Conflict, Outcome, and Sentence as
fixed effects, and Item and Subject as random effects. We tested
for each of the two-way interactions, testing Target against a
model dropping each of the fixed effects. We found a significant
two-way interaction between interaction between Sentence and
Outcome [X2(1) = 105.5, p < 0.0001], and a significant interaction
between Sentence and Conflict [X2(1) = 7.59, p = 0.006]
8.
Children’s responded differently based on whose desire was
reported and whether that outcome was positive or negative, and
their responses were much less influenced by the presence of a
conflict.
Children were successful in the conflict cases, whether they
were being asked about either positive or negative outcomes. In
the NEGATIVE NO CONFLICT condition, children were successful
in saying that neither they nor Froggy wanted an outcome where
no one got to stamp. In the POSITIVE NO CONFLICT condition,
where both the child and Froggy got to stamp, some children
played the game in a competitive way, responding that neither
they nor Froggy wanted the outcome where both players got
to stamp (n = 30; mean age = 3.6), while other participants
were more charitable, responding that both they and Froggy
wanted this outcome (n = 10; mean age = 3.8). The histogram
in Figure 2 shows that children were normally choosing either
a strategy of responding yes to this condition all the time, or
no to this condition all the time. This indicates that they were
not confused by this condition, but that different children simply
differed in how competitive they chose to be with Froggy. This
8We also ran the same analyses including the children who were excluded due
to yes- or no-biases. We find the same significant interaction between SENTENCE
and OUTCOME and a marginally significant interaction between SENTENCE and
CONFLICT.
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TABLE 7 | Percent yes-responses by condition for Experiment 2.
Conflict/No conflict (within subjects) Outcome (within subjects) Sentence (Froggy vs. Child desire) Target % Yes
CONFLICT POSITIVE (child stamps) “FROGGY WANTS” No 13
“YOU WANT” Yes 80
CONFLICT NEGATIVE (Froggy stamps) “FROGGY WANTS” Yes 74
“YOU WANT” No 15
NO CONFLICT POSITIVE (Child & Froggy stamp) “FROGGY WANTS” Yes/No 40
“YOU WANT” Yes/No 41
NO CONFLICT NEGATIVE (No one stamps) “FROGGY WANTS” No 9
“YOU WANT” No 6
FIGURE 2 | Histogram of responses to Child and Froggy condition.
however, does not affect whether a conflict with someone else’s
desires impacts performance on interpreting want.
Our results indicate that 3-year-olds behave in an adult-like
way in interpreting want even when they are asked to assess a
character’s desire that conflicts with their own, as long as they
are given adequate training and opportunity to understand the
rules of the “game” used to test this ability9. Importantly, when
Froggy gets to stamp, the child does not get to stamp. So if the
child’s desire in the context of the game is to stamp, then a positive
outcome for Froggy is a negative outcome for the child and vice
versa. Thus, we can interpret children’s correct interpretations of
sentences about Froggy’s desires as evidence of their ability to
represent desires that conflict with their own.
One potential problem with this study is the possibility that
the “desire” that we induced in the child in the game is not a
real one. During the game, the child does not choose which color
is linked to the opportunity for them to stamp, and the color-
outcome pairs are constantly changing every four trials. The
rotation of colors and outcomes was an important manipulation
9An anonymous reviewer points out that children’s behavior is also consistent with
children interpreting want as need in this experiment.
to ensure that the results were not affected by color biases,
but it’s possible that this manipulation had an effect on the
strength of participants’ desires. If the participants in this task
did not have a strong or meaningful desire about the color of
the card, this task could not successfully test conflicting desires,
since children would not have to override their own desires
about color. In order to control for this possibility, we ran a
small sample (n = 8) on a slight modification of Experiment
2, designed to induce a more deeply rooted desire in children.
In this manipulation, each child chose which color led to which
outcome, and the color/outcome pairings did not change during
the course of the game. This allowed the child to have a more
deeply rooted desire, because they had a say over which color
would mean a positive outcome for them, and this stayed
consistent throughout the game. All other aspects of the task
and analysis were identical to Experiment 2. We find the same
pattern of performance in this control study, indicating that
success in Experiment 2 is not due to the lack of a real desire in
the participants.
Discussion of Experiment 2
Previous tests of want either did not require the child to evaluate
desires that directly conflictedwith their own, or themethodology
was problematic and results were inconclusive. In order to fully
understand children’s early understanding of the verb want, it
was necessary to further explore children’s interpretations ofwant
sentences under these conditions. Experiment 2 improved on
previousmethodology, and showed that 3-year-olds responded in
adult-like fashion to want sentences used to report desires that
conflicted with their own desires. This suggests that children’s
knowledge of the verb want and the underlying concept is robust
at this age, and not disrupted by complex situations involving
processing conflicting desires.
In order to truly test interpretation of want without the
confound of interference from errors caused by lack of
understanding of the game, it was critical to include only children
who can show, outside the context of interpreting conflicting
desires, that they understand its rules. However, it is possible
that the children who were included in the test items of our
task are children who are more advanced in other cognitive
systems, such as executive function or memory. Given the
evidence that children with higher executive function are better
at tasks involving processing mental states (Leslie and Thaiss,
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1992; Leslie and Roth, 1993; Leslie and Polizzi, 1998; Roth and
Leslie, 1998; German and Leslie, 2000; Leslie et al., 2005; Rakoczy,
2010; Devine and Hughes, 2014; Fizke et al., 2014), it is possible
that the sample of children who succeeded in learning the
rules of our game were children who may have an independent
advantage in understanding the test sentences. Furthermore,
some evidence suggests that the ability to participate in a
competitive game correlates with children’s performance on the
traditional false belief task (Priewasser et al., 2013). If so, the
sample of children who were able to pass the training on this
task may also have been more advanced in attributing mental
states.
Experiment 2 shows that, as long as children are able
to understand the rules of this game, they are successful in
interpreting want sentences that report conflicting desires. We
leave it to future research to probe further whether children that
are unable to learn the game also have the ability to represent
desires that conflict with their own.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from our experiments show that 3-year-olds
understand want sentences in an adult-like way, even when they
report counterfactual and conflicting desires, including desires
that conflict with their own. This shows that by age three, children
have an adult-like understanding of the verb want. It also shows
that, even when measured by the most stringent standards,
children are able to represent the subjective desires of others.
Without an adult-like concept of desire, it is unclear how children
could consistently correctly interpret want sentences reporting
such conflicting desires.
These results also have implications for our understanding
of children’s understanding of the belief concept and the verb
think. At the same age as we find success in interpreting
want, children have notorious difficulty understanding think
sentences when they report a false belief, that is, a belief that
conflicts both with reality, and with their own beliefs. Our results
suggest that children’s difficulty with think cannot be explained
solely as difficulty processing a report of a mental state which
conflicts with reality or with their own mental state, and that the
asymmetry observed in the acquisition of these two verbs is not
due to differences in the ways in which these verbs have been
tested.
Three possible sources for the asymmetry in children’s
understanding of want and think sentences can be found in the
literature. First, it may reflect an asymmetry in the development
of the concepts that these verbs express (cf. Perner, 1988, 1991;
Tardif and Wellman, 2000; Perner et al., 2003, 2005; Perner
and Ruffman, 2005; for an overview see Steglich-Petersen and
Michael, 2015), perhaps because the concepts of belief and
desire differ in complexity (see Flavell, 1988; Schwitzgebel, 1999,
among others). According to this CONCEPTUAL ASYMMETRY
hypothesis, the desire concept appears earlier than the belief
concept, which awaits the development of a full Theory of Mind,
around age 4, as evidenced by children’s consistent failure at
explicit false belief tasks before then (Wellman et al., 2001).
A number of recent studies with young infants however
cast doubt on this hypothesis, and suggest that children show
(implicit) understanding of belief very early, when tested through
implicit measures (Woodward, 1998, 1999, 2003; Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Kovács et al., 2010;
Senju et al., 2011). Whether these infant results truly show belief
understanding or not is a matter of active debate in the literature
(see e.g., Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Thoermer et al., 2012;
Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Heyes, 2014). But if young children
lack the belief concept, or have difficulty accessing it in explicit
tasks, such as tasks testing their comprehension of think, we
expect them to have difficulty with think longer than with want.
Another possible explanation for children’s ease with want
and relative difficulty with think is that the differences in
the acquisition trajectories are linguistic in nature. de Villiers
(2005), for instance, argues for a SYNTACTIC ASYMMETRY in the
acquisition of the syntax of tensed vs. untensed complements.
This can explain why we see adult-like performance with want
earlier than has been observed with think. Potentially problematic
for this type of explanation, however, are languages like German.
In German, want can also take a tensed sentential complement,
but it still doesn’t trigger the same errors as think sentences
do, when the complement is false, which makes it doubtful
that this specific piece of syntactic knowledge can entirely
explain the asymmetry (cf. Perner et al., 2003). A more recent
proposal from de Villiers assumes that the important feature of
false complements must be semantic, having to do with how
the different perspectives on a proposition are represented (de
Villiers and de Villiers, 2009).
Alternatively, children’s relative difficulty with think could be
due to a PRAGMATIC ASYMMETRY in the kinds of pragmatic
enrichments that these verbs trigger (Hacquard, 2014; Harrigan,
2015; Hacquard and Lidz, to appear). Think sentences can be
used to make indirect assertions. Lewis and colleagues (Lewis
et al., 2012, 2017; Lewis, 2013) provide evidence that such
pragmatic uses might be responsible for children’s tendency to
reject think sentences when they report a false belief. Want
sentences report preferences and, as such, are not routinely used
to make indirect assertions; they thus do not lead children down
the same pragmatic garden path as think sentences. As Lewis
et al. (2017) showed that 3-year-olds were able to reject false think
sentences that report a false belief, our own inclination is to lean
toward this PRAGMATIC ASYMMETRY hypothesis (see Hacquard
and Lidz, to appear for further elaboration).
CONCLUSION
The two studies presented in this paper have probed 3-year-
olds’ knowledge of the verb want in contexts in which it is used
to report conflicting or counterfactual desires. This was critical
to get at children’s knowledge of this verb, especially given the
observed difficulty children of the same age have in interpreting
think in equivalently complex situations.We find that 3-year-olds
are adult-like in interpreting want sentences, even when they are
used to report desires that conflict with reality, or with other
desires, including their own.
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